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TELEGRAPH COMPANIES;
TRACT.
In a recent case

LIMITATION

OF LIABILITY

BY

CON-

decided by the Supreme Court of

Kentucky, Western Union Tel. Co. v. Eubank, 36 L. R. A. 711

(Feb., i897), it was held that a contract limitation of sixty days,
within which a claim must be presented in writing, for damages on
account of the default of a telegraph company in respect to the

transmission of a message, is unreasonable and contrary to public
policy; and that if not an attempt to vary the statute of limitations, it would, if enforced, have that effect.
The court cited no authorities in support of its decision, but
many cases are found in the books in which it has been declared
that this time agreement has the effect of a statute of limitation, and
in some jurisdictions similar regulations are construed to constitute
a limitation of liability. In Western Union Tel. Co. v. Longwill,
21 Pac. (N. M.) 339 (1889), the court was of the opinion

that it would introduce into the local jurisprudence of every state
a species of private statute of limitation or non-claim, and would
avoid the policy of the state in the matter of the time in which
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actions, both in tort and contract, should be brought. In support
of this view, see
estern Union Tel. Co. v. Cobb, 47 Ark. 344
(1886); Western Union Tel. Co. v. ifcKibben, 114 Ind. 511
(1887); Western Union Tel. Co. v. TVar', 83 Ala. 542 (1887);
also, Southern Express Co. v. Caperon, 44 Ala. IoI (1870), in
which a similar limitation was held to be unreasonable and void,
as tending to fraud. In 7ohnson v. Western Union Tel. Co., 33
Fed. (C. C. S. D. Ga.), 362 (1887), the stipulation was
considered unreasonable, since its effect would be to preclude from
the right of action the person to whom a prepaid telegram is
directed and to whom it has never been delivered, no matter how
gross the negligence of the company may be. The same conclusion is reached in Hibbard v. Western Union Tel. Co., 33 Wis.
558 (1873); Western Union Tel. Co. v. Griswold, 37 Ohio, 301
(1881) ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Coolidge, 86 Ga. 104 (1890) ;
9. and Brown v. Postal Tel. Co., 17 L. R. A. (N. C.) 648 (1892).
In a dissenting opinion, in Kirby v. Western Union Tel. Co., 30
L. R. A. (4 South Dakota, 1o5, 436), 612 (1893), Kellam, J., says
that, admitting the reasonableness of the stipulation, it is, nevertheless, repugnant to public policy, since it allows the telegraph company
to require a party to assent to such an agreement before it will
undertake to perform its legal duty. The majority, however, held
that the effect of the stipulation is not to create a new statute of limitation, since the action, after notice of claim served, may be brought
any time within the period prescribed by law; and that the regulation
is reasonable (since the difficulty of ascertaining facts increases with
the lapse of time), and is, therefore, not an attempt to limit the
company's common law or statutory liability. In Western Union
Tel. Co. v. Dougherty, 54 Ark. 221 (1891), it was decided that
such a stipulation was one against the delay or neglect of plaintiff
in presenting his claim, and not unreasonable.
Sixty days have been held to be a reasonable time in Wyestern
Union Tel. Co. v. Jones. 95 Ind. 235 (1884); Ellis v. American
Tel. Co., 95 Mass. 226 (1866); Breese v. U. S. Tel. Co., 48
N. Y. 132 (1873); Southern Express Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Howard,
264 (1874) ; Wolfv. Western Union Tel. Co., 62 Pa. 83 (1869);
Young v. Western Union Tel. Co., 65 N. Y. 165 (1875) ; Western
Union Tet. Co. v. Raines, 63 Tex. 27 (1885); and Squirev.
estern Union Tel. Co., 98 Mass. 232 (1867).
The Supreme
Court of Mississippi, in Southern Express Co. v. Hnnientt, 54
Miss. 566 (1877), decided that a printed stipulation at the bottom
of an express receipt for a package, that the company shall not be
liable for any loss unless a written claim shall be made at the shipping office within thirty days, is valid. The same period was held
to be a reasonable time in Western Union Tel. Co. v. Durfield, i i
Colo. 335 (1888) ; Western Union Tel. Co. v. Culberson, 79 Tex.
65 (1890) ; Cole v. Western Union Tel. Co., 33 Minn. 228
(1885); Afassengale v. Western Union Tel. Co., 17 Mo. 257
(1885); and Beasley v. Western Union Tel. Co., 39 Fed.
(C. C. W. D. Tex.), i81 (1889).

NO rES.
AUCTION SALE-VALDITY-EMPLOYMENT OF " PUFFERS."
In
Broman v..MfcClenahan,46 N. Y. Suppl. 945 (Supreme Ct., Aug. 4,
1897) (See Progress of Law, 36 AM. L. REG. & REV. N. S." 175
(Nov. 1897)), it was decided that where the owner of a property
puts it up at auction, and secretly employs "puffers " to bid in his
behalf, a bidder at such sale to whom the property is struck off, can
disaffirm his contract.
In England there were formerly two distinct lines of cases on this
question. The common law courts followed the rule first laid down
by Lord Mansfield in Baxwell v. Christie, Cowp. 395 (1776),
where it was held that the employment of a "puffer" at an auction
sale, rendered the sale void. The Court of Chancery, however,
held that the hiring of a "puffer" was not a fraud and would not
vitiate the sale: Conolly v. Parsons, 3 Ves. Jr. 625, note 1 (1797).
Later the same court modified this rule by drawing a distinction
between "puffing" in order to raise the price and "puffing"
to
protect the interests of the vendor. The former was held illegitimate while the latter was allowable: Smith v. Clark, 12 Ves. Jr.
477 (i8o6) ; Flint v. Woodin, 9 Hare, 618 (1852).
This conflict of opinion in England was ended in 1867 by an
Act of Parliament, which declared "Whenever a sale by auction of
land would be invalid at law by reason of the employment of a
' puffer,' the same shall be deemed invalid in equity as well as at
law." So the law of England is now in accordance with the decision
handed down in Baxwell v. Christie (supra). The Supreme Court
of the United States follows the same rule: Peazie v. Williams, 8
How. 134 (850).
In Pennsylvania the courts at first adopted the English Chancery
rule, as modified in the later cases, and held that the employment
of a "puffer " did not invalidate a sale if it was done solely to
prevent a sacrifice of the property: Steele v. Ellmaker, i i S. & R.
86 (1824). This case was subsequently overruled and it is now
held that the employment of even one "puffer"
is sufficient to
avoid the sale: Pennock's Appeal, I4 Pa. 446 (i85o); Stamues v.
Shore, 16 Pa. 200 (i85) ; Yerkes v. Wilson, 8i Pa. 9 (1870).
SEARCH WARRANT; MINISTERIAL OFFICERS.
State v. Guthrie,
38 Atl. 368 (Me., June 16, 1897). The facts of this case are
stated in the "Progress of the Law" of this issue; the precise
point decided appears never to have been.ruled upon previously
and deserves further consideration. The point is, that a warrant
to search for intoxicating liquors is void at the end of a reasonable
time after it is given to the proper officer for execution (in this
case, three days), and the officer's authority thereunder expires ;
what is such reasonable time being a question of law which depends
upon the circumstances of each case. The court declares that it is
a general principle of our law that "Ministerial officers assuming
to execute a statute or process upon the property or person of a
citizen shall execute it promptly, fully and precisely; " and that,
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under the Maine Statute, promptly means immediately or within
such time as the court deems reasonable under the circumstances.
It would seem that this conclusion should be reached independently of the interpretation of any statute, from the ministerial
character of the officer executing a search-warrant. A ministerial
officer has no discretion as to performance of the acts pertaining to
his office: Penningtonv. Streight, 54 Ind. 376 (1876) ; Sullivan
v. Shankin, 63 Cal. 251 (1883); 19 Amer. & Eng. Encyclo.
Law 392. Having no such discretion he should perform the acts
required of him by law, within a reasonable time as construed by
a court ; otherwise he might wait indefinitely, and thus practically
choose not to act. This principle has been applied to ministerial
acts, other than the execution of a search-warrant, as follows:
Sheriffs and constables must execute process within a reasonable
time, under the circumstances: Lindsay's Exrs. v. Armfeld, 3
Hawk's (N. C.), 548 (1825); Kittridge v. Bellows, 7 N. H. 399
(1835); Hallett v. Lee, 3 Ala. 28 (1841); Tucker v. Bradley, 15
Conn. 46 (1842); hzitney v. Butterfield, 13 Cal. 335 (1859);
Hearn v. Parker, 7 Jones (N. C.), 150 (1859); Chapman v.
Thornburgh, 17 Cal. 87 (i86o); Phillipsv. Ronald, 3 Bush (Ky.),
244(1867) ; Freudensteinv. AfcNier, 81 Ill. 208 (1876) ; French
v. Kemp, 64 Ga. 749 (188o); Elmorev. Hill, 51 Wis. 365 (1881);
State v: Leland, 82 Mo. 260 (1884); Cowan v. Sloan, 95 Tenn.
424 (1895); Guiterman v. Sharvy, 48 N. W. 780 (Minn.)
(1891).
A tax-collector must pay to the proper officer the money
he collects, within a reasonable time; Justices v. Fenimore, Coxe(N. J.), 242 (1794) ; Chenangov. Birdsall, 4 Wend. (N. Y.) 4 5 3
(1830) ; Sheridan v. Van Winkle, 43 N. J. L. 125 (1881). An
officer charged with the repair of highways must make repairs within
a reasonable time: Adsit v. Brady, 4 Hill, (N. Y.) 630 (1843) ;
Hooverv. Barkhoof, 4 4 N. Y. 113 (1870). A sheriff must set out a.
debtor's exemption: Handy v. Sheriff, 50 Mich. 355 (1883) ; and
remove property levied upon: Davis v. Stone, 120 Mass. 228
(1876) ; Williams v. Powell, ioi Mass. 467 (1869) ; within a
reasonable time. And it seems logical, as well as necessary to the
protection of the citizen, to apply the same principle to the "sharp
and heavy police weapon," the search-warrant.
NEGOTIABLE

INSTRUMENTS;

LIABILITY

OF

MAKER;

FRAUD.

The City Court of New York, in General Term, has decided that a
party who is induced to sign a promissory note by fraud or deception practiced upon him by the payee, and signs it, thinking that
it is a different kind of contract, is not liable thereon to an innocent indorsee for value before maturity, unless the maker was.
guilty of laches or carelessness in omitting to ascertain the true
nature of the instrument: Hutkoff v. Voje, 46 N. Y. Suppl. 9o5.
(July 2, 1897). See 36 AM. L. REG. & REv. (N. S.) 724. This.
is not a new rule in New York: Bank v. Veneman, 43 Hun. 24r
(1887).
But one who has all the means of information at hand,
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and chooses to rely upon the representations of another as to the
nature of the paper which the former is signing, is estopped by
his negligence from setting up the fraud in obtaining the note as
against a bona fide purchaser for value before maturity: Chapman
v. Rose, 56 N. Y. 137 (1874).
There is rather a hopeless conflict of authorities regarding
the liability of persons whose names appear on negotiable instruments, through fraud, when the paper is in the hands of bona fide
holders. An attempt at reconciliation would be useless. There
are many cases where persons have been induced by fraudulent
representations to sign negotiable paper, intending and believing
that they were signing some other form of contract. There is
authority for the proposition, that in the absence of negligence on
the part of such persons, they are not liable, even though the paper
come into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for value before
maturity: Taylor v. Atchinson, 54 Ill. 196 (1870); Puffer v.
Smith, 57 Ill. 527 (871) ; Anderson v. Waler, 34 Mich. 113
(1876); Bank v. Zierman, 5 Neb. 247 (1876); Griffiths v. Eel0ogg, 39 Wis. 290 (1876); Green v. Wilkie, 66 N. W. 1046
(Iowa, 1896). And this would seem to be because there was no
contract originally, inasmuch as the person so signing had no intention of signing such a paper: Walker v. Ebert, 29 Wis. 194
(87x).
But it is necessary for the maker to show freedom from
negligence: Bank v. Steffes, 54 Iowa, 214 (x88o).
However, if
the fraud be made possible by the negligence or carelessness of
the maker, he is liable to a bonafide holder: Garrardv. Haddan,
67 Pa. 82 (1870) ; Douglass v. Mfaltig, 29 Iowa, 498 (1870).
In any case, however, the bona fide holder of a negotiable instrument, fraudulent in its inception, can recover from the maker only
so much as the former paid for it: Beckhous v. Bank, 22 W. N.
C. (Pa.), 53 (1888); Oppenheimer v. F. & Al. Bank, 36 S. W.
(Tenn.), 705 (1896).
On the other hand, it has been decided that it is no defence to
an action by a bonafide holder against the maker of a note that the
latter was induced to sign it by fraud: Broadbentv. H-uddlesn, 2
W. N. C. (Pa.), 293 (1876); Bank v. M1cCann, ii Id. 480
(1882) ; Highsmith v. Martin, 24 S. E. (Ga.), 865 (1896).
Nor
can such a note be invalidated in the hands of a bona fide holder
unless actual fraud can be shown on his part: Matthews v. Poythress,
4 Ga. 287 (1848); Worcester Bank v. DorchesterBank, io Cush.
(Mass.) 488 (1853); Croslyv. Grant, 36 N. H. 273 (1858); Bank
v. Hoge, 7 Bosw. (N. Y. Superior Ct.), 543 (1861); Aagee v.
Badger, 34 N. Y. 247 (i866) ; Hamilton v. Vought, 34 N. J. L.
187 (x870) ; Bank v. Hewitt, 34 Atl. (N. J.), 988 (1896).
But
the holder of such a note has the burden of proving his good faith:
Hardware Co. v. Bank, io9 Pa. 240 (1885); Hale v. Shamon, 57
Hun, (N. Y.) 466 (18go) ; Jones v. *Burden,56 Mo. App. 199
(1893) ; Campbellv. Huff, 31 S. W. (Mo.), 603 (1895); Hodson
v. Glass CO., 40 N. E. (I11), 971 (1895); Fawcettv. Powell,
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43 Neb. 437 (1895) ; Thamnling v. Duffy, 37 Pac. (Mont.), 363
(1895).
ALIENS; TAXATION ; EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS.

The United

States Circuit Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania, per
Acheson, J., recently declared the Pennsylvania Alien Tax Law
unconstitutional: Fraserv. McConway &- Sorley CO., 54 Leg. Int.
364, 6 Dist. R. 555 (Aug. 26, 1897).
The act in question imposed upon employers of alien laborers a
tax "at the rate of three cents per day for each day each of such
foreign-born, unnaturalized male persons may be employed," and
authorized the employer to deduct the amount of the tax from the
wages of the employee. This latter provision made the tax really
upon the employee and not on the employer: Bell's Gap R. v. -Pa.,
134 U. S. 232, 239 (1889), in which it was said that a tax laid on
a railroad corporation, to be paid out of the interest of its bonds, is
a tax on the bondholder and not on the corporation. The case
thus falls squarely under the Fourteenth Amendment, the guarantees
of which "extend to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, without regard to differences of race, color, or
nationality:" Matthews, J., in Yick Wov. Hopkins, i8 U. S. 356,
369 (x886).
Some of the western states have adopted ingenious methods of
discriminating against the Chinese, the particular class of aliens
especially hated in the mining districts. They have cloaked their
taxation in the guise of a license system for certain classes of business,
putting a "license"
of $25 on hand laundrymen employing one or
more other persons, while requiring steam laundries to pay a fee
of $1 5 only: State ex rel. Foi v. French, 17 Mont. 54 (1895).
The law was held valid because in terms it applied to all male
laundrymen of every condition and nationality, the court remarking: "The fact that Chinamen are engaged in the hand-laundry
business is purely fortuitous."
See this case in 30 L. R. A. 415,
where it is fully annotated. But where the aliens obnoxious to the
legislature have not engaged in one kind of business exclusively, it
would seem that all opportunities for discriminating against them in
taxation are barred by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Gulf, C. &- S. F. R. v. Ellis, 165 U. S. i5o, i65 (1897)
declares that classification for purposes of taxation must have a.
reasonable basis. In that case the State of Texas had by law
allowed parties having a valid claim against a railroad corporation
to recover the amount of the claim pls attorney's fees. This was
held an unreasonable discrimination against the railroads. In R.
.R. Tax Cases, 13 Fed. 722 (1882) a law taxing property in
general at a reduction from face value, but assessing taxes on railroad property at its actual worth, was decided to be unconstitutional.

